This paper analyses the interaction between school tracking policies and peer effects in OECD countries. Using the PISA 2006 dataset, we show that the linear peer effects are stronger and more concave-shaped in the early-tracking educational system than in the comprehensive one. Second, and more interestingly, the effect of peer heterogeneity goes in opposite directions in the two systems. In both student-and school-level estimates, peer heterogeneity reduces students' achievements in the comprehensive system while it has a positive impact in the early-tracking one. For late tracking countries, this result appears driven by pupils attending vocationally-oriented programs. Finally, peer effects are stronger for low ability students in both groups of countries.
Introduction
The quality of the educational system is commonly recognized to affect economic growth and the equalization of students' opportunities. International assessment programs (i.e. PISA, TIMMS, PIRLS) constitute a unique instrument to analyse the determinants of educational quality in a comparative perspective, circumventing problems of skill comparability. With the aim of explaining the failure of a resource-based approach to schooling production, shown by the lack of correlation between educational inputs and outputs (Hanushek 1986 (Hanushek , 2003 , several studies emphasize the institutional dimension of the educational system and, specifically, the role played by school autonomy and well-designed accountability practices (e.g. Woessmann et al. 2009 ). In these studies, much less attention has been devoted to the social aspects of the learning environment in terms of peer composition, social context and broad neighbourhood effects.
The importance of peer variables in explaining differences in educational achievements has been emphasized by a large theoretical literature 1 , whereas at the empirical level the identification of peer effects remains cumbersome as exhaustive determinants of students' sorting to schools are often unavailable to the econometrician (Nechyba 2006) . However, since peer group composition depends on policies affecting sorting, exploiting cross-country differences in these policies can provide interesting insights to better understand the way in which the peer group composition affects educational outcomes. Among sorting policies, school tracking is likely to be particularly important as it determines the allocation of students to schools offering completely different programs. Following the empirical strategy presented in section 2, the main novelty of this paper consists in extending current cross-country analyses on the determinants of students test scores inquiring how the interplay between peer composition and school tracking policies affects students' outcomes.
It is well understood that tracking policies, both between and within-schools 2 , play a key role in determining the sorting of students from different background and abilities (Epple et al. 2003, Brunello and . Especially early school tracking between vocational and academic-oriented schools creates relatively more homogeneous learning environment along observable (e.g. parental background) and students' characteristics that are often unobservable (ability, motivation, attitudes, etc.) . In Germany, for instance, low ability students are sorted into the vocational track increasing the peer-group homogeneity along an unobservable dimension (Dustmann 2004, Checchi and Flabbi 2007) . By the same token, since lessadvantaged students have a higher likelihood of being enrolled in the vocational track, the few who enter the academic track are probably particularly motivated and/or talented. An early differentiation of educational programs often implies a substantial diversification of learning patterns, i.e. more or less oriented towards practical and theoretical knowledge, and hence should lead to an increase the degree of heterogeneity 1. See De Bartolome (1990) , Benabou (1996) , Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) , Hoxby (2000) , Lazear (2001) , Durlauf (2004) . 2. Within-school tracking consists in grouping students into different classes according to their ability and prevails in Anglo-Saxon countries; between-schools tracking assign students to completely different segments of the education process at early ages, generally offering general or vocational programs such as in Germany and in many central European countries (Brunello and Checchi 2007) .
between-rather than within-schools. Finally, comprehensive and early-tracking systems are inspired by different educational philosophies and hence differ in many other aspects affecting students' sorting, such as the number of slots in vocational programs, the share of students tracked by ability, school's admission policies.
With these premises in mind, one should expect that, for a given level of observable peer heterogeneity, schools in early tracking countries are on average characterized by a lower level of unobservable peer heterogeneity. Put it differently, it might be the case that the observable functional relationship between peer variables and achievements substantially differ in the two systems. This difference should become particularly evident when the relationship between peer group composition and final outcomes is nonlinear and changes slope depending on the effective level of peers. The presence of nonlinearities is essential to sketch out policy implications regarding the optimal degree of students' heterogeneity. Were the peerachievement relationship linear, sorting policies would not have an effect on the aggregate level, but only on the distribution, of human capital 3 .
From a theoretical standpoint, peer heterogeneity should affect educational achievements in two ways.
On the one hand, having more homogeneous classes implies similar cognitive levels and the sharing of common behavioural codes, so less teaching efforts devoted to equalize students skills. On the other hand, in heterogeneous classes various types of externalities might arise: disruptive due to the presence of students with a particular bad attitude (Lazear 2001) , or positive knowledge spill-over from good students to average and/or bad ones (Durlauf 2004) . Overall, which effect tends to prevail is an open empirical question that the interaction with school tracking policies can contribute to answer by offering an exogenous variation in the degree of unobservable heterogeneity for a given level of observable peers' characteristics.
Using PISA 2006 data on OECD countries, our empirical study seeks to answer two important questions, which, to the best of our knowledge, no study has jointly addressed so far: 1. Is the relationship between peer composition and achievement non-linear? 2. Is this relationship significantly affected by school tracking policies? The several robustness checks carried out in our empirical analysis lend support to a highly nonlinear peer-achievement relationship and further suggest that peer heterogeneity affects achievement in a completely different way depending on school tracking policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section briefly summarizes the literature to which our work is connected to and discusses the empirical strategy adopted. Section 3 describes the data and provides preliminary evidence on some different characteristics of school policies and students' performances in early and late tracking countries. Section 4 presents the main results based on student-level regressions and several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
3. To be sure, if peer inputs enter linearly in the educational production function, efficiency is unaffected by the reallocation of students to schools and classes; the opposite occurs in the non-linear case (Benabou 1996) . These considerations have relevant policy implications as long as the optimal level of students' heterogeneity is very unlikely to emerge as a market outcome, given the several structural constraints shaping schooling choices: e.g. admission procedures, physical distance, early tracking policies, within-school ability tracking (de Bartolome 1992).
Related literature and empirical strategy
Our paper is related to the empirical literature on peer effects using international assessment surveys.
As known, two issues render the identification of peer effects particularly cumbersome: 1. the reflexivity problem -i.e. the outcome of each student is affected by the mean outcome of the others and, at the same time, it affects the outcome of the others (Manski 1993) ; 2. the selectivity problem -i.e. sorting students to schools depends on several factors, such as residence, parental preferences, tracking and admission policies, school quality, that are difficult to jointly observe (e.g. Nechyba 2006 ).
Because for policy purposes it is relevant to correctly quantify peer effects, rather than to identify their exact source, most of the studies ignore the reflexivity problem and estimate a reduced-form specification of the relationship between student achievements and peers' characteristics where the peers' achievement is not included in the set of explanatory variables and peer variables are measured through parental background (e.g. parental education or occupation) and/or the share of the mates having certain characteristics (e.g. the share of immigrant or female classmates). Actually, since parental background is the single most important determinant of students' achievements, the sign of the coefficient associated with peer levels of family background is usually considered the "relevant" peer effect (Ammermueller and Pischke 2009) .
In order to completely settle the selectivity problem, strict data requirements are needed, namely some exogenous variations that randomly assign students to schools (i.e. quasi-natural experiments), which are very difficult to be verified through data collected by international assessment surveys. However, using the PIRLS survey on pupils at the end of primary education, Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) exploit withinschool variations in the class composition to identify linear peer effects under the assumption that the allocation of students and resources is random within the school 4 . When controlling for measurement errors, they find modestly large peer effects and a small difference in the estimated coefficient obtained in regressions accounting for the selection bias with respect to the OLS ones.
Unfortunately, a similar identification strategy is not feasible with the PISA dataset, because it does not provide classroom information (apart from the class size) and can at most consent to estimate broad schoollevel peer effects. However, for the main scope of this paper, the PISA dataset presents the main advantage of interviewing students aged 15, then above the usual age of first track in the large majority of OECD countries.
Absent data requirements for completely settling the selectivity problem, the few papers that estimate peer effects using PISA have resorted to a second-best identification strategy, based on the claim that the omitted variable bias is the most important source of selectivity bias. Accordingly, the selectivity bias is reduced by adding among the regressors school-level policies and further controls that are likely to affect the sorting of students to schools 5 . In a study on Denmark, Rangvid (2007) uses the parental academic and cultural interest to mitigate the selectivity problem. Quantile regressions allow her to find stronger peer effects for low ability students, whereas social heterogeneity, measured as the standard deviation of parental education, has an 4. A similar strategy is followed by Hoxby (2000) , Hanushek et al. (2003) , McEwan (2003) . 5. It is worth noticing that not including peer variables leads to a misspecification of the correct educational production function, whereas including it using a second-best strategy leads at most to an incorrect quantification and (perhaps) interpretation of what the peer effects capture, i.e. broad contextual effects or true effects on learning (Zimmer and Toma 2000) .
insignificant impact on students' achievements along the entire distribution of test scores. Similar results are found for Austria by Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2007) , which exploit the large number of possible school types that can be chosen by Austrian students to control for unobservable factors affecting sorting. The crosscountry study of Vandenberghe (2002) , based on the TIMMS dataset, displays a negative and significant effect of class heterogeneity (measured with the standard deviation of a composite index of family background) on students' attainments. In a slightly different paper with a focus on immigrants, Entorf and Lauk (2006) In our empirical analysis, we mainly follow the omitted variable argument used by Rangvid (2007) and Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2007) .
To be more precise, we extend the common specification of the schooling production function used in the literature on PISA scores (e.g. Fuchs and Woessmann 2007) including peer variables and their interaction with school tracking policies:
(1).
The achievement of student i in school s and country c (A isc ) is the resultant of a vector of individual (X i , including family background), school (X s ), country (X c ) controls to which we add school compositional variables:
the share of schoolmates with certain characteristics, such as gender, immigrant status, grade, etc. ( ), and a flexible functional form to capture the influence of peer characteristics related to family background .
The flexible functional specification is required as -apart from a linear peer effect summarized by the mean schoolmates' family background -non-linear peer effects can be either captured by the mean peer squared, or by the peers' standard deviation, or by both. Specifically, the square of the mean captures the concavity in the relationship between student's achievement and peer characteristics, whereas the standard deviation shows the extent to which this concavity is associated to a greater school heterogeneity 6 . To capture differential peer effects depending on school tracking, we also introduce an interaction term between peers and a dummy equal 1 if the country tracks students earlier than 13.
Finally, the error is decomposed in a country effect u c , a school effect u s and a correlated school-individual effect u is plus an independent error term u isc . The school-individual interaction might be a source of selectivity bias as it is correlated with both peer variables and achievements. It is worth recalling that this bias hinges upon unobservable variables affecting students' sorting. Under the assumption that these unobservable variables are mainly captured by 6. A specification with both the square of the mean peer and the peers' standard deviation is used by Vandenberghe (2002) and Zimmer and Toma (2000) for similar reasons. Interestingly, literature on the environmental Kuznets curve often includes both the income per capita squared and an index of inequality to jointly assess the curvature of the emission-income relationship and to investigate the scope for income redistributions favouring emission reduction (see, e.g., Ravallion et al. 2000) .
other socio-demographic school-composition variables (e.g. the share of immigrants or of students enrolled in vocational programs within the school) and school characteristics, peer effects appear correctly assessed using "school-level clustering-robust" OLS regressions and controlling for countries' characteristics.
In particular, among the many school variables we can control for (see tab. A1), we have information on two aspects that are strongly connected with students' sorting: school admission procedures and school types (private vs. public). In the robustness checks, we also add pseudo-school fixed effects -built as the quintile of the distribution of the school average family background in each country -, dummies for the evaluation procedures followed by the school and proxies of ability tracking within the school. All these variables should mitigate the selectivity problem as they are information upon which parents select schools. For instance, pseudo-school fixed effect can be seen as a proxy of what kind of school environment parents expect to find in a certain school rather than in another, whereas the share of pupils enrolled in vocational programs represent a proxy of school type and quality.
As a refinement of our empirical strategy, school-level regressions allow to improve the identification of the peer heterogeneity. In particular, averaging by school equation (1) we obtain an expression where the correlated term school-individual is indistinguishable from the school fixed effect u s . More precisely we obtain:
(2).
In eq. 2 the linear peer effect is indistinguishable from the family background effect, which was one of the individual characteristics in equation 1. So, only the standard deviation of peer's background can be identified, but in a better way; specifically, the estimation bias is further mitigated by taking the average of the unobservable individual characteristics within the school and hence reducing the effect of outliers on the estimated coefficients. As a result, the impact of background heterogeneity is more likely to be correctly assessed and the functional relationship between peer heterogeneity and achievement correctly specified if the sign and the significance of the associated estimated coefficient remain substantially unchanged once moving from individual-to school-level estimates.
As a final caveat, school tracking itself should contribute to the identification of peer effects. Because tracking represents an additional constraint for the sorting process, less unobservable heterogeneity should characterize schools in the early tracking system. All else equal, the differential impact of peer heterogeneity on outcomes in the two systems gives us additional information on the shape of the effective peer-achievement relationship.
Dataset and descriptive statistics
In our empirical analysis we use the PISA 2006 survey that covers all OECD countries and has a target population of 15-year-old students, regardless of the grade they currently attend. The PISA dataset records several variables both at the school and at the student level (see table A1 for a full list) 7 . More specifically, it contains detailed information on student's home background, school resources and a wide range of 7. Since the PISA dataset does not provide information at the class-level, we are not able to infer if possible peer effects come from an actual interaction between students rather than from a broad contextual effect.
institutional variables capturing the degree of school autonomy, accountability practices and variables affecting the students' sorting to schools. A rich set of basic individual controls is also available, whereas policy variables at the national level are usually integrated by other datasets (OECD and UNESCO, see tab.
A1). Since PISA-2006 is mainly focussed on science, we consider the achievement in science as our main dependent variable and then checks whether results change for reading and math.
Some of the variables considered here are indexes built by PISA experts in order to summarize questions on specific school or individual characteristics. For instance, the degree of autonomy in managing resources at the school level is captured either by a vector of highly interdependent dummies (autonomy in withinschool allocation, in hiring and firing teacher, etc.) or by a synthetic indicator built upon these dummies (see table A1 for details). The same holds for indexes of school resources and family background 8 .
The synthetic background index built by the OECD and called the Economic Social Cultural Status "escs" is our preferred measure of family background as it combines various dimensions shaping the impact of family characteristics on the student's attainment: highest parental years of education ("pared"), the highest occupational level quantified with the index of occupational status ("hisei"; Ganzeboom et al. 1992) , the "number of books at home" and the resources available at home to study (the "homepos" index). Indeed, by construction, all these variables are highly correlated with the escs.
As natural measures of peer variables, we take the average level of the schoolmates' escs (net of the individual one) for the linear peer effect, whereas possible nonlinearities in the peer-achievement relationship are captured by the squared average escs and by the standard deviation of students' escs.
Moreover, in order to partially account for cross-country differences in the sorting process, we normalize the standard deviation at the school level with the one at the country level 9 . Finally, other variables capturing the socio-economic school environment are included as explanatory variables (i.e. the shares of females, immigrants, students speaking a foreign language at home or attending a vocational program).
The classification of countries into early tracking and late tracking constitutes another important issue to address. Similarly to Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) , we measure between-school tracking policies with a 0/1 dummy variable that intends to capture not only the direct effect of tracking on students' outcomes, but also broader differences in the design of the educational system. Differently from Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) , we assume that tracking displays its effects with a lag of two years and hence a country tracks "early" if students choose before they are 13 years old (see . This is because a high heterogeneity at the school level can be due to a high heterogeneity in the country rather than to randomly sorting students to schools. However, all results are robust to the inclusion of the 'no-normalized' standard deviation of backgrounds at the school level. Results using this further measure of heterogeneity are available upon request by the authors. 10. Literature provides several alternative measures of school tracking policies: Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) to schools with at least15 interviewed students, i.e. we drop schools with less than 15 interviewed students (around 6,400 students). Our final sample includes 202,817 students clustered in 6,728 schools (see table 1 ). Table 1 shows the summary statistics of PISA science scores for the countries considered in the econometric analysis. To emphasize the differences between the early tracking and the comprehensive system, we report summary statistics for each group separately. Country means and standard deviations in science scores are, respectively, higher and lower in early tracking countries than in late tracking ones. More importantly, the dispersion of average school performances is significantly higher in countries tracking students earlier. Whereas this result was theoretically expected, the incidence of tracking on school heterogeneity is substantial and very large. In fact, between-schools variation in test scores explains more than half of the overall variation in the early-tracking countries, compared to roughly a quarter in late tracking ones.
Differences between the two systems are much broader than this, as it appears evident looking at the mix of other policies affecting students' sorting (see table 2 ). In early tracking countries, schools consider less frequently students' residence as a prerequisite or a high priority for enrolment, whereas a major role is assigned to students' performances in previous educational steps. In some late tracking countries (especially in Anglo-Saxon ones), the large majority of schools groups students into different classes according to their abilities, at least in some subjects. Moreover, early tracking countries display a significantly higher fraction of students enrolled in the vocational stream compared to the comprehensive group. In sum, this evidence seems to suggest that differences in tracking are accompanied by a different mix of complementary sorting policies and justify our choice of using a dummy to capture it.
On the contrary, no differences among the two groups of countries emerge with respect to the distribution of the index of economic social condition status and to the share of foreign students (see table 3 ). The only difference concerns the country mean of escs which is higher in early tracking countries, due to the presence in the late tracking group of three outliers with very low average escs, i.e. Portugal, Spain and Poland. By excluding these three countries, the weighted average escs in late tracking countries increases up to 0.17 (a value only slightly below the one in early-tracking countries), while the negative cross-country correlation between the mean and the standard deviation of escs decreases from -0.511 to a much lower and acceptable value of -0.157.
Econometric analyses
According to the empirical strategy outlined in section 2, we analyze the determinants of students' scores in science. We first estimate a basic specification of eq. 1 without peer effects as done in the existing literature on cross-country studies (Fuchs and Woessmann 2007) . Moving from this benchmark, we estimate an augmented specification with peer variables and then analyse in detail the role of school tracking policies:
first interacting peer variables and the "early tracking dummy" and then running separated regressions for the two groups of countries. Finally, we carry out school-level regressions (section 4.2) and quantile regressions, which allow to observe how the impact of peer variables change along the distribution of students' abilities (section 4.3).
In all specifications of the schooling production functions estimated in this section, four blocks of explanatory variables are included (see table A1 for details). school responsibility for resources' allocation ("respres") and for curriculum and internal assessment ("respcurr") 11 , two dummies for private and public schools, two dummies for the admission procedures, signalling if residence or abilities are a priority or a prerequisite for being enrolled in that school. Note that variables on admission procedures seem particularly well suited in order to reduce the omitted variable bias due to a non-random assignment of students to schools.
School Compositional
Variables (all calculated net of the individual one): the mean age and the shares of females, of "foreigners" (immigrants and people speaking a foreign language at home), of students attending vocational programs and our main peer variables based on three statistics on the schoolmates family background (proxied by the escs index), i.e. the mean, the square of the mean and the standard deviation.
4. Country-level controls: the share of students subjected to external evaluation and/or standard test in science 12 , the age of tracking between different kinds of programs (general or vocational), the duration of and the pupils' share enrolled in pre-primary education, GDP per capita and the expenditures in secondary education. In some robust checks, country level controls are replaced by country fixed effects.
In robustness checks a fifth block of control variables is added:
5. School Additional Controls: pseudo school fixed effects (i.e. dummies for the quintiles of the country-specific distribution of the average parental escs which the school belongs to), controls about the degree of school competition and accountability practices internal to the school, two dummies capturing if there is an ability grouping internal to the school for some subjects or for all subjects (see table A1 for a detailed description of these additional controls).
11. In all regressions shown in this paper, we include the 'respres' and 'respcurr' indexes (see table A1 and OECD 2009) instead of the dummies about the single components of school autonomy and responsibility about resources and curricula, due to the several missing values characterizing each dummy. Replacing these dummies with the two OECD indexes, which by construction have much less missing values, does not alter our results. 12. The share of students subject to standardized external examination has been shown to be an important determinant of students' attainments (Fuchs and Woessmann 2007) .
Student-level regressions
In student level regressions, three additional methodological adjustments are in order for improving the reliability of our estimates. First, missing values on certain individual characteristics are not randomly distributed, but appear related to family background and ability. As a result, dropping students with missing information on some variables could engender a sample selection bias. In order to copy with this issue, we impute individual missing values regarding family background (escs, pared, hisei and homepos variables, see table A1) and some individual characteristics (immigrant and foreign language) according to the usual methodology followed in the literature (Woessmann 2004) . Second, the "school-level clustering-robust" linear regression method is always used in student-level regressions to estimate standard errors that recognize the schools as the basic unit of sampling in the survey (Woessmann 2004 ). Third, in order to obtain representative coefficient estimates from the stratified survey data, students' sample weights are used in all estimations of students' scores.
In the following tables we present estimated coefficients, standard errors and p-values only for peer variables, because the sign and the significance of the other variables included is consistent with main findings of the existing literature emphasizing the importance of school and country institutional features over school resources (see Fuchs and Woessmann 2007 , Woessmann et al. 2009 , Hanushek and Woessmann 2010 .
In table 4, we present models that differ for the functional specification of peer effects chosen. The model ST-0 is the standard model considered by the literature on the students' scores production function (Fuchs and Woessmann 2007) , whereas the following models include school compositional and peer variables. The comparison between model ST-0 and the subsequent ones clearly confirms that the inclusion of schoolmates characteristics substantially increases the fitness of the estimations: the R 2 grows from 0.307 to values around 0.340 13 . This suggests that a penalty is associated both with the choice of including peer variables and probably incurring in an identification problem, on the one hand, and with the one of not including peer variables and of reducing the explanatory power of the regression, on the other.
As shown by model ST-1 of table 4, an improvement in the average escs of the schoolmates is associated with a better student's achievement. The size of this effect is also significant and somehow larger than the one found by other studies (Ammermueller and Pischke 2009) . In particular, a 1-standard deviation increase in the average escs leads to a 25 points increase in the student's scores, that is a quarter of the standard deviation in PISA scores, normalized to 100 14 .
In model ST-2, we add also the escs standard deviation to capture the influence of peer heterogeneity.
While the sign and significance of the linear peer effect do not change, peer heterogeneity displays a negative but small and weakly significant association with achievements: a change in 1 standard deviation leads to a reduction in the average score of 1.35 points. This result is in line with the ones of the previous literature finding a small, but often insignificant, negative effect of heterogeneity on students' performances , Rangvid 2007 .
13. A R2 around 34 % is in line with the one found by the two studies using a large set of controls to reduce the omitted variable bias in the estimation of peer effects on PISA scores (Rangvid 2007; Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer 2007). 14. One standard deviation of schoolmates' average escs and of the standard deviation of escs amount, respectively, to 0.49 and 0.14.
The model ST-3 shows that the small negative influence of heterogeneity on scores does not hinge upon the particular shape of the schooling production function, which appears concave-shaped. The quadratic term is in fact highly significant and negative. These results remain unchanged if we include both the quadratic term of the mean escs and the standard deviation (model ST-4). Overall, mixing students negatively affects student's outcome, but keeping relatively more homogeneous schools around the average is better than having relatively more homogeneous schools spread over the entire support of the escs distribution.
In model ST-5 we consider the interplay between schoolmates composition, school tracking policies and students' performances. Hence, we include also the interactions of the mean and the standard deviation of the schoolmates' escs with early tracking dummy. We prefer to leave aside the interaction between the linear peer squared and the tracking dummy as it could render less transparent the sign of the interaction between peer heterogeneity and the tracking dummy. As expected, both interaction terms display a positive and highly significant estimated coefficient. In line with the theoretical literature ) and the empirical findings by Entorf and Lauer (2006) , linear peer effects are higher in the early tracking system.
The novel result is that more heterogeneous schools seem to exert an opposite impact in the two groups of countries: they improve students' performances in early-tracking countries, whereas they worsen achievements in late tracking ones. Table 5 shows that this differential impact of heterogeneity in early and late tracking countries is confirmed by robustness checks analyzing the model ST-5 for math and read. Looking at model ST-5a in the same table, also the inclusion of additional school variables and of pseudo school fixed effects does not alter our main findings, in spite of the significant reduction in the sample size due to several missing values on these additional variables. Finally, it is worth noticing that the differential impact of peer variables depending on school tracking mainly concerns peer heterogeneity. In fact, in the tougher specification with the full set of school controls, the interaction between the early tracking dummy and the linear peer effect is not anymore significant. Table 6A shows that our results remain unchanged when running models ST-1 and ST-2 separately for the two educational systems. First, linear peer effects are higher in early tracking countries: one standard deviation explains 28.5 and 22.9 PISA points in early and late tracking systems, respectively. Second, the coefficient of the peer heterogeneity term is significant with opposite signs in the two systems: early-tracking (+) and comprehensive (-). The magnitude of this effect remains modest as one standard deviation in the escs standard deviation leads, respectively, to a 2.1 increase and a 2.5 decrease in PISA scores. Finally, the R 2 is much higher in regressions concerning early tracking countries, perhaps reflecting the lower within-school unobservable noise.
In many schools, students can choose between vocational and non-vocational education. Moreover, the fraction of students enrolled in vocational programs substantially differs in the two groups of countries. To capture these important aspects of the two systems, we interact peer variables with the dummy about the kind of school program. Model ST-3 shows that this interaction term is statistically insignificant in early tracking countries, but it is highly significant in the comprehensive school system. In the late tracking system, the linear peer effect appears higher for students attending vocational courses, whereas higher heterogeneity reduces students' performances. As a result, the negative relationship between peer heterogeneity and performances in late tracking countries appears mainly driven by schools offering vocational programs, which are often of lower quality.
Adding to the base model pseudo-school fixed effects and additional controls does not alter results, but the significance of the heterogeneity coefficients in early tracking countries reduces at cut-off significance level of 82% (model ST-2a).
Finally, in both systems the relationship between schoolmates' family background and students' scores is concave-shaped and of similar size (model ST-3 in table 6A ). This result might be driven by the fact that, in the comprehensive system, there are three outlier countries (Spain, Portugal and Poland; see table 3) with a very low average escs. If we exclude these three countries from the late tracking group, the linear peer substantially increases and the square of the average peer turns out being statistically insignificant (table 6B) .
This latter result reinforces our claims that school tracking heavily influence the shape of the peerachievement relationship and that the scope for mixing students is much higher in the early tracking system.
School-level regressions
As discussed in section 2, school-level regressions -i.e. the mean score at the school level is the dependent variable -could allow to improve the identification of the peer heterogeneity. Recall that, in this case, only the standard deviation of peer's background can be identified, but perhaps in a better way because averaging individual unobservables reduce the influence of outliers. Table 7 shows school-level estimates which are carried out always including school additional controls.
In the pooled SC-1 model, a negative and significant impact of students' heterogeneity is confirmed 15 .
Moreover, the differential impact of heterogeneity in the two systems is confirmed, both in the specification with the interaction terms and in separated regressions (models SC-2). Now, the size of the estimated coefficients of peer heterogeneity appears larger in comparison with student-level estimates: a change in one standard deviation of heterogeneity leads to a decrease of 4.7 school mean PISA points in late tracking countries and to an increase of 2.3 points in early tracking ones. As expected, because a large part of the performance variation across students has to be attributed to individual unobserved variables (e.g. their innate ability or learning motivation), when averaging variables at the school level the R 2 significantly increases and again it is still much higher in the group of early tracking countries.
Quantile regressions on students' scores
A final interesting exercise consists in running quantile regressions to condition the estimates of peer effects to an implicit distribution of student abilities. This exercise is particularly important here as the impact of early-tracking on sorting could mainly operate through unobservable student abilities. Estimating 15. A change in one standard deviation of the average escs index turns out to explain 41 out of the 100 points of the standard deviation in the student attainments. This is not surprisingly as long as, in school-level regressions, the average escs identifies both the peer and the individual background effect, which is usually the larger explanatory factor of student outcomes (e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann 2010).
model ST-2 of table 4 for each decile of the distribution of students' achievements, quantile regressions show that the linear peer effect is positive all along the conditional test score distribution and remarkably higher in early tracking countries (table 8 and figure 1) . Moreover, similarly to previous studies (Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer 2007, Rangvid 2007) , this effect is slightly larger in lower deciles while the main differences between the two groups of countries pertain the effect of peer heterogeneity (table 8 and figure 2 ). In the early tracking group, its sign is significantly positive and slightly U-shaped along the entire test score distribution. In late tracking group, the effect of peer heterogeneity is significantly negative and slightly lower in upper deciles.
In sum, quantile regressions reinforce the previous finding in terms of a significant efficiency-enhancing effect of mixing students in early tracking systems, where individuals are probably more homogeneous in their unobservable features. Conversely, the picture in comprehensive systems is nuanced: on one hand, stronger peer effects at the bottom of the ability distribution would lead to support policies aimed at increasing background heterogeneity; on the other hand, a too high heterogeneity might turn out offsetting the efficiency-enhancing effect of mixing students.
Concluding remarks
This paper analyses the impact peer heterogeneity on students' performances in different tracking regimes. Unlike previous studies often focussing on a single country, the cross-country dimension of our analysis consents us to exploit the variability in school tracking policies to investigate how peer effects interact with this important aspect of the educational system. Our descriptive analysis reveals profound differences between the early tracking and the comprehensive system along several policies affecting students' sorting and lends further support to our main research focus.
We confirm previous studies showing that linear peer effects are heavier in the early tracking system.
More interestingly, we show that the impact of peer heterogeneity changes sign depending on the school tracking policies. In the early-tracking system, peer heterogeneity has a positive impact on students' outcomes and the peer-achievement relationship is concave-shaped. In the comprehensive system, we do not find evidence of non-linear peer effects while higher peer heterogeneity negatively affects student achievements. However, the latter result appears driven by pupils attending vocationally-oriented programs.
Our findings remain robust to several robust exercises, such as school-level regressions, the inclusion of several controls correlated with students' sorting and of pseudo school fixed effects.
All these findings point, as a possible explanation, to a different way in which the tracking system affects the sorting of students by unobservable characteristics. In the early tracking system, better students might put more efforts to signal their higher abilities and motivations sooner in order to enter the academic track. If this is the case, the unobservable degree of heterogeneity should be lower in early tracking countries and, hence, the scope for mixing students should take also this ability dimension into account. However, our analysis is not able to fully distinguish the effect of school tracking on sorting from the one related to heterogeneity in school quality, which is likely to be higher in the early tracking system. In fact, differences in school quality are only partially accounted for in our analysis using the share of students enrolled in vocational programs.
A final caveat is required to use these results for policy purposes. The significant impact of peer heterogeneity on students' performances is rather small both in the comprehensive and in the early-tracking system, hence favouring student mobility and the mixing of background might have a cost well-above the benefits in terms of efficiency. Also, the large variation in the factors affecting the students' sorting and selection, both within-and between-country, would require further analyses to obtain more limpid policy implications regarding the scope of policies aimed at mixing students of different backgrounds. Individual characteristics 3 For each variable, the first row refers to the estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard erroradjusted for clustering at the school level -and the third to the P value.
4 Imputation dummies for missing data are included in all regressions. Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data. 3 For each variable, the first row refers to the estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard error -adjusted for clustering at the school level -and the third to the P value.
4 Imputation dummies for missing data are included in all regressions. 5 Pseudo-School fixed effects are identified, for each country, according to the quintile of escs average of every school. Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data. 
